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Abstract
This article examines the development of the rules concerning criminal and civil law 
against family violence. It analyses the social changes and legal evolution from a 
mutual immunity of spouses to a widespread legal protection of victims of domestic 
violence. It aims to depict the tendencies towards the application of general tort law in 
civil law cases and towards special rules providing more and specific protection within 
criminal law. In this context the article also critically considers the latest international, 
European and Italian legislation.
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1 Introduction – The Evolution of Intra-Family Tort Rules
In the course of time, the rules concerning criminal and civil law against family 
violence developed from a mutual immunity of the spouses – in fact of the 
husband – to a widespread legal protection of victims of domestic violence. 
With regard to these fundamental changes this article, which is divided into 
three parts, will examine the evolution of the intra-family tort rules in order to 
depict the latest international, European and Italian legislation in the field of 
this subject. The focus will be on tort rules and offenses that do not constitute 
specific violations of family duties (e.g. maintenance) but which could be 
Patti
european journal of comparative law and governance 3 (2016) 117-129
<UN>
118
committed towards anybody (such as violence) and do not find a typical regu-
lation within the family law.
In particular, the first part of the article will examine the former doctrine of 
interspousal immunity, whose essential element was the ‘unity of spouses’. The 
second part will discuss the decline of the same doctrine and – also as a result 
of family law reforms in the last century – the following application of general 
tort rules. Finally, the last part of this article will illustrate the most important 
recent legislation in criminal law regarding female and family protection, 
which has been enacted on an international, European and national level. The 
legislation includes the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and com-
bating violence against women and domestic violence, the Directive 2012/29/eu 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/jha, as well as the Italian 
law no. 119/2013, implementing the aforementioned European directive.
2 The Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity
2.1 ‘Unity of Spouses’ and their Mutual Immunity
The problem of tort liability between husband and wife has been subject to 
studies in Anglo-American law more than in other legal systems and culmi-
nated in a doctrine of interspousal immunity. In order to understand such a 
doctrine, one needs to know its historical context and grounds, such as the 
economic dependence of the wife on her husband, the limitation of the wife’s 
legal capacity, including her right to sue and to be sued, etc. In fact, it has to be 
taken into consideration that in the past marriage meant that even though the 
married woman formally still had the capacity to own property, the right to use 
and to enjoy her assets was assigned to her husband, with the consequence 
that the wife became its mere title holder.1 Besides, the act of marriage deprived 
the woman of her legal capacity to act as well as to be a party to a judicial pro-
cess, and any actions for the compensation of the damage caused to the mar-
ried woman could only be initiated by her husband.2 This resulted, amongst 
others, in the unavailability of an independent cause of action between the 
1 See McCurdy, ‘Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation’, Harvard Law Review 43 (1930) 
1030 at 1033–1041.
2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in 4 Books (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765) 
430.
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spouses.3 It therefore appears that the provision granting immunity from tort 
liability to the party committing a tort within the spouses’ relationship consti-
tuted the logical corollary of the limitations imposed upon the wife’s legal 
capacity.4
The justification for such immunity following the marriage was originally 
deducted from the principle of ‘unity of spouses’, which stated that husband 
and wife legally were considered a unity. The ‘unity of spouses’ doctrine, which 
has had a huge impact on the former Anglo-American legal thinking through-
out the years, led to the principle of ‘interspousal immunity’ as the basis for the 
handling of controversies involving injuries between husband and wife as well 
as to the non-applicability of tort liability rules. Given the fact that the 
law considered the spouses to be ‘one person’, the spouses – as one subjective 
identity – could not be liable when causing damages to one another, whether 
undertaken wilfully or negligently. This meant that the woman, who was not 
able to sue except in the name of her husband, for many years, did not have any 
protection against the latter.
Over the years, when the fiction of the ‘unity of spouses’ was abolished 
granting the married women inter alia more property rights, the courts estab-
lished another basis for the immunity between the spouses, which was then 
followed for several decades. In particular, the judges supported the protection 
of family harmony and domestic peace and considered that those principles 
should prevail over the ones that justified the application of the tort liability 
rules.5 The idea was that involving tribunals in matrimonial conflicts would 
cause damage to the family harmony and to the domestic peace and should, 
therefore, be avoided at the expense of any sanctions due to tortious conduct.
Compared to the United States of America, the legal situation in Europe dif-
fered with regard to this subject. In fact, aside from England which also had a 
similar ‘unity of spouses’ and immunity doctrine, continental legal systems 
such as those of Germany or Italy did not follow such principles. However, 
there was no different modus operandi of the rules on tort liability in continen-
tal legal systems: The rules regarding tortious conduct were not applied as legal 
3 Patti, ‘Intra-Family Torts’, in: Glendon et al. (eds.) International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, vol. iv, Persons and Family (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr and 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), 1 at 7.
4 Ibid.
5 Brown v. Groster, 262 S. W. 2d 480 (Ky. 1953) and comment Townsley, Texas Law Review 32 
(1953/1954) 884. Only in rare cases it was allowed for the married woman to act against her 
husband. For an analysis see Albersworth, ‘Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts’, 
California Law Review 10 (1921/1922) 461 at 471.
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actions generally were not initiated, e.g. the damaged family member refrained 
from suing judicial relief.6
2.2 The Marital Rape Exemption
In this context special attention needs to be paid to the marital rape exemp-
tion, which provided criminal immunity to the husband regarding the rape of 
his wife.7 This exemption granted to the husband has been developed by the 
common law as a consequence of the principle of the ‘unity of spouses’ and 
was adopted by nearly all American jurisdictions. According to the older case 
law the spouses were to be considered as one entity, leading to the result 
that – since the husband “may not rape himself” – rape between the spouses 
during marriage was simply unimaginable.8 Consequently, the principle regard-
ing the ‘unity of spouses’ not only spared the husband from the application of 
the civil law rules, but also from criminal prosecution. Another argument used 
to justify the husband’s criminal immunity was based on the property rights he 
had in relation to his wife. While the husband was entitled to take actions in 
order to protect his property rights in case of a rape of his wife by a third party, 
the use of violence by himself against his wife was the equivalent of the exer-
cise of those property rights and thus not to be considered illegal.9
The decline of the abovementioned concepts after some decades did not 
lead, however, to a renouncement of the immunity principle. Instead, the 
American jurisdiction searched for new grounds on which to base this princi-
ple and to guarantee immunity from criminal liability in case of a rape of the 
married woman by her own husband: the ‘consent’ given by the former. It was 
argued that by celebrating marriage the wife also agreed to engage in sexual 
intercourse with her husband as well as to accept all of his demands. Thus, a 
refusal from her side would legitimate her husband to use violence towards his 
spouse.10
6 Patti, ‘Intra-Family Torts’ (n 3) 3.
7 In common law rape was defined as sexual intercourse by a male with a female, who is not 
his wife, without her consent, but it was also ruled out between spouses.
8 See decisions recalled by Glasgow, ‘The Marital Rape Exemption – Legal Sanction of 
Spouse Abuse’, Journal of Family Law 18 (1980), 565.
9 Ibid.
10 Lord Matthew expressed this concept for the first time in 1847. For full references see 
Schultz, ‘The Marital Exemption of Rape – Past, Present and Future’, Detroit College Law 
Review 11 (1978) 261. On the need for actual consent see Harris, ‘Towards a Consent 
Standard in the Law of Rape’, University of Chicago Law Review 43 (1975/1976) 613; Scutt, 
‘Consent in Rape – The Problem of the Marriage Contract’, Monash University Law Review 
3 (1977) 255.
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As regards countries of the Romanic tradition, in Italy, more than in others, 
tortious conduct of the spouses has been without sanctions. Some old cases 
had constituted the non-liability of the husband as ‘head of the family’ for 
actions taken while exercising the jus corrigendi. In fact, he was granted 
the right to discipline his wife by “violent but moderate means”, as stated by 
the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) at the beginning of the last 
century.11 However, the ‘violent but moderate means’ implied that the hus-
band, nevertheless, would be held liable whenever his damaging actions 
exceeded the normal limits of the jus corrigendi. As a result, even though the 
husband actually had the power to correct his wife physically, the immunity 
principle has also never been fully accepted in Italy, and generally, only few 
legal proceedings can be found.12
3  The Decline of the Immunity Doctrine and the Rise of the 
Application of General Rules
Reflecting on the fundamental changes in social customs and traditions, e.g. 
the conception of equality between husband and wife and the respective fam-
ily law reforms, the doctrine of interspousal immunity declined in the course 
of the last century. Nevertheless, and as observed above, the abolition of the 
‘fiction’ of the ‘unity of spouses’ in the Anglo-American law did not at first lead 
to a different approach in the legal praxis as courts then based the spouses’ 
immunity upon the idea of protecting family harmony and domestic peace. 
These principles were deemed to be prevailing and precluded the application 
of general tort liability rules. Only following legislative interventions (espe-
cially in the second half of the 20th century) by means of statutes providing 
gradually more and more comprehensive rights for one spouse to sue the other 
one due to the tortious conduct of the latter, the courts gradually dismissed the 
idea of immunity.13 Corresponding court rulings (e.g. new case law) then estab-
lished the grounds for further legal actions based on general tort rules. In 
England such legislative intervention took form in the ‘Law Reform Husband 
11 See Cass. 19 June 1936, Annali di diritto e procedura penale (1937) 138.
12 Longo Dorni, ‘In tema di ‘ius corrigendi’ del marito’, Giurisprudenza italiana (1959 ii) 305; 
Patti, ‘Intra-Family Torts’ (n 3) 14.
13 Legal provisions and according court decisions first abandoned the immunity doctrine in 
property damage cases (Patti, ‘Intra-Family Torts’ (n 3) 11; see for the reasoning of its appli-
cation nonetheless in personal injuries actions Edmond v. Edmond, 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 
(1924)).
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and Wife Act’ of 1962 which expressly granted spouses the right to seek dam-
ages against each other “as if they were not married”.14
In the continental legal systems, without the obstacle of case law affirming 
inter-spousal immunity, general tort law could be and was indeed applied, as 
for instance with regards to the Italian provision of Article 2043 of the Italian 
Civil Code.15 However, the problem arose as to what extent this general appli-
cation was possible. Within this context, it was discussed in Italy whether or 
not general norms of civil liability were applicable besides the special norms 
regulated in the family law book, such as the remedy of divorce. Many authors 
opposed such a wide scope of application, placing emphasis on the ‘closed’ 
character of the family law book and arguing that under a wide scope of appli-
cation no appropriate treatment of the special relationship between spouses 
could be granted.16 Over time this opinion was overruled in the Italian legal 
doctrine, with the consequence that general norms of civil liability also gov-
erned cases of compensation for damages caused and suffered by family 
members.17
With regard to legal immunity in the field of criminal law the overall picture 
that has to be drawn differs from the evolution that emerged on the horizon 
of civil law. It is only at the beginning of the early eighties of the last century 
that the attitude as to the matter of rape exemption and consequently the 
14 Thomson, ‘The Reform of Family Law in England’, in: Chloros (ed) The Reform of Family 
Law in Europe (Deventer, Boston a.o.: Kluwer, 1978) 43 at 74; Kahn-Freund, ‘Wandlungen 
des englischen Familienrechts seit 1945’, RabelsZ 28 (1964) 232 at 260, who perceives the 
1962 Law as a result of the profound changes that occurred in the family (structures) after 
the Second World War.
15 Article 2043 Italian Civil Code: “Risarcimento per fatto illecito. Qualunque fatto doloso o 
colposo che cagiona ad altri un danno ingiusto, obbliga colui che ha commesso il fatto a 
risarcire il danno.” “Compensation for unlawful acts. Any intentional or negligent act that 
causes an unjustified injury to another obliges the person who has committed the act to 
pay damages.”
16 For a recent critical opinion on the possibility to apply the general rule for tort liability 
and for references to the older interpretation, see Nicolussi, ‘Obblighi familiari di protezi-
one e responsabilità’, Europa e diritto privato 4 (2008) 929. Interesting problematic aspects 
can be also found in Paradiso, ‘Famiglia e responsabilità civile endofamiliare’, in: Famiglia, 
Persone e Successioni 7 (2011) 14; Di Rosa, ‘Violazione dei dovere coniugali e risarcimento 
del danno’, Familia 4/5 (2008) 3.
17 E. Carbone, ‘La giuridificazione delle relazioni domestiche e i suoi riflessi aquiliani’, 
Familia (2006) 102. In jurisprudence, the most argued affirmation regarding the applica-
bility of the rules for civil offenses also in the relationship between family members can 
be found in Cass., 10 May 2005, n. 9801, in: Famiglia e diritto (2005) 365; Corriere giuridico 
(2005) 921.
 123Intra-Family Torts
european journal of comparative law and governance 3 (2016) 117-129
<UN>
jurisdiction changed, even if judicial decisions condemning the tortious con-
duct of a rape between spouses can be dated as far back, for example in Italy, 
to the year 1976.18 From thereon, it was perceived that the physical integrity of 
an individual involved a matter of public interest and as a consequence any 
‘consent’ by a married woman to injuries concerning her human body was 
inadmissible and the respective principle was deemed to be obsolete.19 
Furthermore, the problem of prior and little convincing argumentation accord-
ing to which a woman would have had sufficient alternative remedies outside 
criminal law and to which limitations would have been necessary in order to 
avoid the risk of abusive false charges, was overcome.20 Nevertheless, the evo-
lution of criminal law provisions against violence in families seems, maybe 
more than in the area of civil law, a continuous ‘work in progress’ until recent 
times. In fact, it can be observed that the long-fought application of general 
rules is de facto not sufficient to protect wives in intra-family violence cases. 
Under this perspective the development of special norms on the international 
level, as well as their implementation and consideration on the national level 
over the last decade, is of particular interest.
4 Special Rules of Criminal Law on Female and Family Protection
4.1  Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence
On the international level, the Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul 
Convention), which was opened for signature on May 11, 2011 in Istanbul 
(Turkey) and which came into force on August 1, 2014 is one of the most inter-
esting legal instruments in the present context. As of June 2015 the Istanbul 
Convention has been signed by 39 countries, including Italy,21 and is the 
first legally binding instrument creating a broad and comprehensive legal 
18 The judgment of an appellate court which had found a husband guilty of rape was 
affirmed by the Penal Division of Cass. 4 Dec. 1976 no. 2855, in: Rivista Penale (1977 i) 281. 
The Penal Division not only held the judgment to be consistent with the present law but 
also referred to constitutional principals regarding human dignity and personal liberty.
19 Harris, ‘Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape’, University of Chicago Law Review 
43 (1975) 613 at 635.
20 Patti, ‘Intra-Family Torts’ (n 3) 10 s.
21 Italian law no. 77/2013, “Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione del consiglio d’Europa 
sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza 
domestica fatta a Istanbul l’11 maggio 2011”.
Patti
european journal of comparative law and governance 3 (2016) 117-129
<UN>
124
framework. In fact, it focuses on preventing domestic violence and all forms 
of violence against women, protecting victims as well as prosecuting any 
offenders.22 Moreover, the Convention shall contribute to the elimination of 
all forms of discrimination against women and promote substantive equality 
between women and men.
In order to do so, one of the Istanbul Convention’s purposes is to promote 
international co-operation between the undersigned countries, as globalisa-
tion often implicates the involvement of persons belonging to different nation-
alities in cases regarding violence. This aspect refers to a mutual interpretation 
and application of the Istanbul Convention as well as a close co-operation 
between authorities, police and courts of different countries in order to guar-
antee as much protection of the victims as possible.
Several definitions established in the Istanbul Convention are worth men-
tioning as they reveal a new attitude of the legislator concerning the rights of 
women. For instance, by examining Article 3 a), according to which ‘violence 
against women’ is defined as a violation of human rights and a form of dis-
crimination against women, the relationship between the protection of 
women, human rights and rules regarding discrimination is illustrated. 
Moreover, the definition is quite broad and comprises all forms of gender-
based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psycho-
logical or economic harm or suffering to women including rape, stalking or 
sexual harassment as well as any threat of such acts. Another noteworthy defi-
nition is seen in Article 3 b) of the Istanbul Convention concerning ‘domestic 
violence’, which means any of the above-mentioned acts that occur within the 
family or domestic unit, irrespective of biological or legal family ties, whether 
or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim. 
Due to the fact that no joint residence is required, violence committed after 
the end of a relationship is thus also covered by the definition. Domestic 
violence mainly comprises the violence between current or former spouses 
or partners (intimate-partner violence) or the inter-generational violence 
between parents and children. As one can see, the definition does not refer to 
just any of the sexes but includes victims and offenders of both sexes. The final 
definitions worth highlighting are those regarding ‘gender’ and ‘gender-based 
violence against women’ set forth in Articles 3 c) and d) of the Istanbul 
Convention. The former means the socially constructed roles, behaviours, 
activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women 
22 Article 1 a) Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence.
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and men. In order to overcome these gender roles, Article 12 (1) of the Istanbul 
Convention actually foresees that the obligation to eradicate prejudices, cus-
toms, traditions and any other practices that are based on the idea of the infe-
riority of women or on stereotyped roles for women and men is one of the 
general obligations of the Istanbul Convention. The second kind of conduct 
(gender-based violence against women) is defined as violence directed against 
a woman because of the fact that she is a woman or because the violence 
affects women disproportionately to men.
The countries having signed the Istanbul Convention are obliged to crimi-
nalise various offences, inter alia psychological violence, stalking, physical vio-
lence, sexual violence including rape, forced marriage, female genital 
mutilation, forced abortion and forced sterilisation as well as sexual harass-
ment (see Articles 33 to 40 of the Istanbul Convention). The protection 
becomes effective in the light of Article 52 of the Istanbul Convention, accord-
ing to which the judge is entitled to order the party committing domestic vio-
lence to leave the victim’s household and to prohibit any further contact.
4.2 Directive 2012/29/eu of the European Parliament and of the Council
The Directive 2012/29/eu of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
October 25, 201223 (Directive) is another noteworthy international treaty con-
cerning the matter in question that requires being examined in detail. As men-
tioned in Recital 13 of the Directive, the latter applies in relation to “criminal 
offences committed in the Union and to criminal proceedings that take place 
in the Union”.24
According to the Directive’s subtitle, it establishes minimum standards on 
the rights, support and protection of victims of crimes. In particular, Article 1 
(1) of the Directive entitled “Objectives” states that the purpose of this Directive 
is to ensure that victims of crime receive appropriate information, support and 
protection and are able to participate in criminal proceedings. Article 2 (1) a) 
of the Directive provides the definition of ‘victim’ as a “natural person who has 
suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss 
which was directly caused by a criminal offence” or “family members or a per-
son whose death was directly caused by a criminal offence and who have suf-
fered harm as a result of that person’s death”. With this regard, ‘family members’ 
means “the spouse, the person who is living with the victim in a committed 
23 Directive 2012/29/eu of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25th October 2012 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of 
crime, and replacing Council framework Decision 2001/220/jha.
24 See Recital 13 of the Directive.
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intimate relationship, in a joint household and on a stable and continuous 
basis, the relatives in direct line, the siblings and the dependents of the victim”, 
see Article 2 (1) b) of the Directive. Comparing the aforesaid objectives set 
forth in the Directive with the purposes of the Istanbul Convention provided 
for under its Article 1, the Istanbul Convention can be considered a very special 
treaty of rules as it aims to prevent and combat violence against women in 
particular and domestic violence. The Directive, on the other hand, is a more 
general treaty and provides protection for any “victims of crimes”, regardless of 
the victim’s sex.
However, violence in relationships and families as well as violence against 
women in particular are mentioned in the Recitals of the Directive. For 
instance, Recital 18 of the Directive refers to violence committed in a close 
relationship and establishes that such an offence is committed by a person 
who is a current or former spouse or partner or family member of the victim, 
whether or not the offender shares or has shared the same household with the 
victim. In accordance with what has been foreseen in the Istanbul Convention, 
the Directive does not necessarily require that the person committing the vio-
lence and the person being victim to such violence do live or have lived 
together in order for the Directive to be applied. As in these cases the offending 
person is a person whom the victim of violence should be able to trust, the 
Directive acknowledges that victims of violence committed while being in a 
close relationship might need special protection measures. The Directive even 
goes one step further and recognises that this type of violence mainly affects 
women and that the situation can be even worse if the woman is dependent on 
the offender economically, socially or as regards her right to residence.25
The Directive, just like the Istanbul Convention, pays special attention to 
the protection against gender-based violence.26 For example, Recital 17 of the 
Directive deals with such kind of violence defining it as violence that is directed 
against a person because of that person’s gender, gender identity or gender 
expression or that affects persons of a particular gender disproportionally. This 
is, of course, inclusive of but not limited to women, and also takes into account 
physical, sexual and psychological as well as economic violence.
Furthermore, under Chapter 2 the Directive contains several provisions 
for information and support for the victims, including, inter alia, the victim’s 
right to receive information from a first contact with a competent author-
ity  (Article 4), the victim’s right to receive information about his/her case 
(Article 5), or the victim’s right to access victim support services (Article 8). 
25 Recital 18 of the Directive.
26 See Recitals 9, 17, 38, 56, 57, 61 of the Directive.
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Due to the fact that there are a lot of violence-related cases between persons of 
different nationalities, Article 7 of the Directive foresees the victim’s right to 
interpretation and translation of the information essential to exercise his/her 
rights in criminal proceedings.27 Chapter 3 of the Directive, on the other hand, 
is dedicated to the victim’s rights when participating in criminal proceedings, 
while Chapter 4 of the Directive governs the victim’s rights concerning his/her 
protection.
According to Article 27 of the Directive, the Member States shall bring into 
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with this Directive by November 16, 2015.
While the Directive surely strengthens the rights of the victims, it conse-
quently weakens the legal status of the person accused of having committed 
violence. By way of example, Article 6 of the Directive foresees that victims 
shall be notified when the person who is remanded in custody, prosecuted or 
sentenced for criminal offences concerning them is released from or has 
escaped detention. The understandable and legitimate need to protect victims 
from further violent attacks, however, must not hide the fact that the offender 
remanded in custody has to be presumed innocent. Indeed, it is not yet deter-
mined at that time whether he has committed the crime and whether he is a 
(further) threat to the victim. The same applies to Article 22 of the Directive, 
which provides for a timely and individual assessment, in accordance with 
national procedures, to identify specific protection needs of the victims and to 
determine whether and to what extent they would benefit from special mea-
sures in the course of criminal proceedings. Such timely performance of the 
assessment of the victim could be in conflict with the presumption of inno-
cence of the person accused. Given the fact that the lack of an actual victimisa-
tion cannot be ruled out during the preliminary proceedings, at that point of 
time one could only speak of a presumed victim. Therefore, an early determi-
nation of the accusing person as a victim with specific protection needs could 
be close to a prejudgment of the offender contrary to the rule of law.
When examining the situation in Italy, its newspapers regularly report on 
cases of marital and domestic violence leading to the death of the wife. This 
might also be a consequence of stress resulting from the current difficult eco-
nomic situation in Italy. Nevertheless, it underlines the necessity of protection 
of the victims as well as prevention of such crimes. In the past and present in 
27 Article 7 (1) of the Directive: ‘Member States shall ensure that victims who do not under-
stand or speak the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are provided, upon 
request with interpretation in accordance with their role in the relevant criminal justice 
system in criminal proceedings, free of charge (…).’
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Italy, the situation regarding marital and domestic violence did not and does 
not differ from that in other European countries. However, it needs to be 
stressed that Italian judges, already from the last century onwards, granted 
compensation for victims of intra-family torts. Such compensation included 
not only the economic loss suffered but, more importantly, non-material losses 
like moral damage, mental suffering etc.
In the light of the pressure to adjust the Italian law to the international con-
ventions, the European directives and the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Human Rights28 as well as the continuous news regarding domestic vio-
lence, the Italian legislator, by means of the Italian law no. 119/2013,29 imple-
mented the aforementioned Directive and also took into consideration what 
has been established in the provisions of the Istanbul Convention. A signifi-
cant novelty has been the new provision regarding the immediate removal of 
the perpetrator from the family home and the order for them to stay away from 
the victim, namely Article 384 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. In 
case of such a removal and restraining order, the victim has the right to receive 
information from the first contact with a competent authority. This is, in fact, 
of great importance, as very often the victims – mostly women – do not dis-
pose of any knowledge concerning these new rules.
5 Conclusion
“Principles belonging to other historical periods may not be the instrument 
of injustice in a profoundly different community.”30 This qotation describes 
the core incentive behind, and at the same time the nature of, the changes 
identified when observing the development of the rules concerning criminal 
and civil law against family violence over the last century until today. Both 
28 See the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, which on several occasions has 
interpreted Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as not only imposing 
negative obligations on States – such as the prohibition of arbitrary interference violating 
the privacy – but also positive ones, in particular with regard to the physical and psychic 
integrity and the self-determination of the person in the domestic contest: M.C. v. 
Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, echr 2003-xii, para. 187; Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, no. 71127/01, echr 
2008-vi, para. 84; E.S. and Others v. Slovakia, no. 8227/04., echr 2009-ix, para. 40.
29 Italian law no. 119/2013, ‘Disposizioni urgenti in materia di sicurezza e per il contrasto 
della violenza di genere, nonché in tema di protezione civile e di commissariamento delle 
province’.
30 Patti, ‘Intra-Family Torts’ (n 3) 12, referring to the judgment Surratt v. Thompson, 212 
Va. 193, 183 S.E.2d 202 (1971).
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Anglo-American and continental Europe legislations changed their perspec-
tive in this legal field, which was accompanied and influenced by profound 
social evolutions, mainly in the area of gender equality.
The methods and ways in which those changes were implemented, e.g. case 
law, new legislative acts etc., of course differed from country to country due to 
the varying legal systems. Nonetheless, the common aim that has been reached 
by taking these different paths regarding family torts is an application of gen-
eral tort law in civil law cases and, as it can be noted in more recent develop-
ments, a tendency towards special rules providing more and specific protection 
within criminal law. It is with regard to the latter that the latest international, 
European and Italian legislative developments represent the modern under-
standing of necessary requirements for granting an adequate protection of 
family violence victims. Even though the level of protection in this field has 
never been on a higher legislative level, reality and practice will evaluate and 
show the actual impact of these new rules. Looking at an alarmingly high num-
ber of domestic violence cases even in recent times, it seems that the legisla-
tion still needs to prove its capacity of being a valuable instrument for achieving 
and securing the ideas and standards of modern society.31
31 For a critique, see also Marandola, ‘Nuove norme in materia di violenza di genere: Aspetti 
processuali’, in: Studium iuris 20 (7) (2014) 527.
